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Abstract 
Ease of Internet accessibility has offered business the opportunity to 
incorporate this electronic infrastructure technology into 
establishing electronic-based supply chains. With the improved 
efficiency that this brings to the management and functionality of 
the supply chain, there are also security considerations that should 
be taken into account for protecting the integrity of the electronic 
supply chain, not only within each business node, but also across 
the entire supply chain. Such security vulnerabilities can be negated 
with the implementation of security measures and policies, however 
these need to be consistent throughout the supply chain and 
regularly assessed against security benchmarks in order to ensure 
they meet adequate security standards.  
 
Introduction  
Supply Chain (SC) proponents have initially invested significant time 
and effort in gaining efficiencies through reducing lead time and 
shortening the product life-cycle within a SC. Through re-
engineering business processes and introducing information 
systems (IS) designed to integrate within the business entity and 
externally with the IS systems of other SC business partners. In 
short, this supply chain management (SCM) practice requires that 
the integrated IS’s within an electronic SC, by functional necessity, 
must exhibit characteristics of openness. 
 
Until now the security implications of the inherent openness of these 
IS’s within the SC has not been a high priority concern to SCM 
practitioners, due to the primary focus of getting the right product, 
to the right place, at the right time, in the right quantity, for the 
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right price. However, vulnerabilities to electronic SC security do 
exist at several overlapping levels including business-oriented, SC-
centric, technical, and traditional security (Pierce, et al, 2003) and 
the consequences of such exploited vulnerabilities could be 
potentially devastating to the business concerned or more 
importantly impart a cascading effect across the electronic SC 
involving other SC business partners. For example, the 
vulnerabilities could be exploited by indiscriminate internal or 
externally located hackers, a disgruntled employee, or may involve 
corporate espionage. Whatever the motivation, SC partners should 
address these vulnerabilities to minimise the security risks and 
suppress the potential opportunities for security breaches and 
thereby enhance the protection status of the electronic SC.  
 
One method of assessing an organisation's security presence within 
the electronic SC setting is through benchmarking the security 
measures and policies of the various business entities or nodes that 
make up the SC. According to Codling, (1996, p8) benchmarking is 
‘an ongoing process of measuring and improving products, services 
and practices against the best that can be identified worldwide’ and 
this principle can also be applied to the security implementations of 
businesses within the electronic SC.  
 
This systematic evaluation inherent in the benchmarking process 
has been previously adopted by traditional business as a practice for 
analysing and measuring competitive performance attributes, such 
as costs, strategies, and products within their respective business 
domain. Through the application of the benchmarking analysis 
process it is possible for businesses to compare themselves against 
their peers and determine their level of deviation from the ‘norm’, or 
recognise the significance of other established benchmarks 
pertaining to a given number of parameters (Codling, 1996). 
 
Thus it is proposed that the process of benchmarking analysis can 
also be applied to the electronic security (e-security) measures and 
policies of business entities within the SC. This paper outlines the 
nature of electronic SCs, identifies the inherent e-security 
vulnerabilities, the benchmarking concept of E-security within the 
SC and how e-security benchmarking can be used to analyse and 
address security concerns within the domain of the electronic SC. 
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The Electronic Supply Chain 
The authors acknowledge that a major premise of SCM is the 
facilitation of bi-directional information flows across the SC and that 
the results of this are typically evidenced by reductions in non-value 
adding services, production costs, storage and transportation costs, 
errors, product lead time, product lifecycle and overall 
improvements in product quality, quality of information, quality of 
service, communication, and SC relationships. (Although some 
researchers suggest the reverse is a more accurate account of SC 
relationships, viz. Stein et al, 2003; Stockdale and Standing, 2003), 
these sentiments are generally accepted by academics and 
practitioners alike. 
 
The diffusion of communication technology and the proliferation and 
of the electronic communication medium on the back of the 
Internet, now underpins efforts to efficiently streamline the SC and 
hasten operational processes. Hence, the electronic supply chain 
consists of a number of cooperating business entities whose IS’s are 
interconnected via the electronic public infrastructure of the 
Internet, which supports the exchange of information between SC 
partners and serves as the medium for delivering digital services, 
conducting financial transactions and information exchange or 
information sharing.  
 
Therefore the Internet is providing SC entities with many 
opportunities to collaborate with business partners using innovative 
e-commerce solutions. SC and business-to-business (B2B) uses of 
the Internet have come in the form of auction websites – both buyer-
side and seller-side, e-procurement systems (e.g. 
http://www.alibaba.com), virtual private networks (VPN), Internet-
based electronic data interchange (EDI), and consortium trading 
exchanges (CTE) such as the global network exchange 
(http://www.gnx.com) (Turban et al, 2002). 
 
The innovative application of existing public infrastructure and 
technology have provided SC partners with unprecedented 
improvements in business operations.  Also the ease with which SC 
partners can integrate their networks and coordinate their efforts, 
has had a major impact on SCM as managers become increasingly 
reliant upon the Internet for connectivity (Warren & Hutchinson, 
2000). However, with this freedom of connectivity to the Internet 
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comes the insecurity and openness of the infrastructure itself that 
can be exploited and expose businesses and subsequent electronic 
SC’s to insidious vulnerabilities when utilising the Internet.  
 
Electronic Supply chain vulnerabilities 
As SC technologies have continued to develop in complexity, so too 
have the risks that are posed to the businesses that employ them 
(Vasiu, et al, 2002). While the Internet has provided unparalleled 
business prospects, the unwary can succumb to a plethora of 
routinely discovered vulnerability exploits in Internet-enabled 
software. Smith, Yurcik, and Doss (2002) intimate some of main 
risks that businesses are exposed to when doing business on the 
Internet: 
§ Current software engineering techniques do not produce 
systems that are immune to attack; 
§ Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their 
systems against attack; 
§ Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends; 
§ Little evidence to suggest improved security since 
organisations are continually playing ‘catch-up’ with routinely 
discovered vulnerabilities; 
§ Current security tools only address piecemeal technical 
aspects of security whereas information security is a holistic 
issue; and, 
§ System administration is difficult to manage due to 
continuous system patching (Smith et al., 2002). 
The attraction of utilising the convenience of the Internet for 
communication interconnectivity between SC partners can expose 
these businesses to security risks and vulnerabilities that if 
breached, will compromise the security of the entire SC, thus 
placing other businesses making up the SC, at risk. Research 
undertaken by Warren and Hutchinson (2000) identified some of the 
more common information security risks and vulnerabilities SC 
practitioners should be aware of when utilising the Internet as part 
to f the SC communication infrastructure. For example, one of the 
most common forms of attack is password cracking where software 
is programmed to guess and apply common types of passwords, 
such as first names, or it can sequentially test each ASCII 
combination until a match is found. When passwords have been 
cracked the attacker(s) can then log on to a system and, posing as a 
legitimate user, can proceed to steal, modify or erase information.  
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Spoofing attacks occur when the ‘from’ Internet Protocol (IP) address 
is forged to enable a deceptive message to appear as though it 
originated from a trusted source, such as a business partner within 
the SC. Another form of spoofing, known as web spoofing, occurs 
when an assailant sets up a website that looks remarkably similar 
to a trusted website. An example could be WWW.C0LES.COM (spelt 
‘C-zero-L-E-S’), where an attacker may attempt to replicate the 
Cole’s website and collect financial information and passwords from 
business partners that mistakenly visit the website. This bears a 
similar resemblance to recent banking scams that dupe the 
unsuspecting into revealing sensitive information that, like 
password cracking and spoofing attacks, results in the attacker 
collecting legitimate financial and password information that can 
later be used to masquerade as a legitimate user in subsequent 
attacks (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000). 
 
A denial of service (DoS) attack occurs when an attacker floods the 
target host with such an overwhelming number of messages that it 
physically cannot cope with the load and shuts down and thus 
denies legitimate users access to the system. While most DoS 
attacks are regarded as nuisance attacks they nonetheless can still 
inflict considerable financial loss on the target system due to the 
loss of connectivity for prolonged periods (Warren and Hutchinson, 
2000). 
 
Perhaps the worst threat is a direct attack on a target system. In 
this situation the attacker works methodically to expose and exploit 
known and unknown vulnerabilities on the target system. Once the 
attacker gains access to the system, they generally attempt to gain 
Administrator privileges to the system so they can set themselves up 
as a legitimate user to steal, modify or delete information or even 
undertake ongoing corporate sabotage.  
 
Whatever the security situation, SC practitioners can address 
potential electronic security vulnerabilities by undertaking a 
thorough risk analysis of the environment and by incorporating 
adherence to internationally recognised standards in information 
security. Initially however, SC practitioners can improve their 
security systems and practices quickly by applying benchmarking 
techniques that can standardise their approach and ensure best 
practice is adopted. The following section elaborates further on how 
benchmarking can be applied to SCs and therefore facilitate in 
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potentially minimising the risks that vulnerabilities pose to their 
systems.  
 
E-security Benchmarking 
Kolokotronis et al, (2002) noted that all too often e-security was 
regarded as a technological issue that was addressed as an 
afterthought to the implementation process and therefore treated as 
a ‘bolt on’ element that remained unchanged until a security 
incident occurred that breached the current security measures and 
policies in place. In contrast to this perception, Kolokotronis et al 
(2002) proposed that E-security should be regarded as a major 
consideration of the system development plan, which should be 
reviewed against established security benchmarks. This would 
maintain quality and deliver optimal security performance via a 
cyclic revisional system that would ensure the security system 
continued to perform and meet business requirements. 
 
The research of McGaughey (2002) into the benefits of 
benchmarking in an e -business environment establishes a number 
of key points that illustrate the generic benefits that can be gained 
from applying the benchmarking process: 
 
§ The benchmarking process is ongoing, as current business 
practices and performance dynamically change and require 
constant revision to reflect internal and external influences of 
the business environment 
 
§ Quantitative  benchmarks that measure performance are 
preferred; however qualitative measures must also be applied 
to information that cannot be quantitatively measured 
 
§ Benchmarking should be applied across the spectrum of 
business processes, products and activities because they all 
contribute to the success or failure of the business 
 
§ Comparative benchmarking against other business 
competitors is essential in order to identify and adopt best 
practices that are beneficial to improving business outcomes 
 
§ While the goal of benchmarking is to essentially improve 
business performance from a competitive viewpoint, it can 
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also be tailored to specific business areas identified for 
improvement 
 
§ In essence, benchmarking is about identifying, improving and 
learning how to do better the targeted business processes and 
also protect the business against potential threats 
 
In principle, the benchmarking benefits that McGaughey (2002) 
alludes to can also be specifically applied to the e -business security 
measures and policies that are utilised to protect an e -business from 
threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, security benchmarking 
can also be taken another step further and applied to benchmarking 
the security features within an electronic SC. 
 
The ready availability and utilisation of new communication 
technologies by business organisations in the pursuit of greater 
efficiencies in SCM can speed up the exchange of information, 
within the environment of B2B e-commerce over the insecure 
infrastructure of the Internet. However, the individual businesses 
that make up the electronic SC have to seriously analyse and 
implement their own security requirements in order to protect, not 
only their own security interests, but also that of their SC 
counterparts (Al-Mashari, 2002).  
 
The responsibility of implementing appropriate security measures 
and policies to protect the information within an electronic SC 
business for information exchange between SC partners falls to the 
individual SC businesses that make up the electronic SC. Effective 
security measures and policies need to be implemented and 
continuously assessed in order to meet the changing security 
requirements of the individual business organisations and the 
environment of the SC itself. In order to initially deliver and 
establish effective security benchmarks in an Australian context for 
example, the Australian and New Zealand Standard part one 
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 (Standards Australia, 2001) and part 
two AS/NZS 7799.2: 2003 (Standards Australia, 2003) for 
information security management would be the logical starting point 
for the development of such security benchmark development. 
 
Sole reliance on just meeting any internationally recognised 
standard for information security management by SC practitioners 
and SC partners will not guarantee that the security benchmarks 
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developed for assessing security measures and policies 
implemented, will continue to be secure (Standards Australia, 2001). 
Threats and vulnerabilities do not remain static and are constantly 
changing and therefore the security measures and policies in place 
need to be regularly assessed in order to continually improve, 
update or adapt to the dynamically changing nature of threats and 
vulnerabilities to the electronic SC, also alluded to by Smith et al 
(2002). Therefore through the application of regular benchmarking 
of current security measures and policies, steps can be taken to 
review and upgrade the security measures and policies of SC 
partners and therefore strengthen the effectiveness of the 
benchmarked security measures and policies (McGaughey, 2002).  
 
The premise of security benchmarking requires that the security 
benchmarks themselves have to establish a minimum security 
requirement in conjunction with a higher security goal that exceeds 
the current security criterion benchmarked. Following each 
particular benchmarking assessment of a security measure or policy 
the particular benchmark’s security goal is reassessed and updated.  
This is undertaken as a process of continuous improvement to 
promote continued strengthening of the security status of the 
business within the electronic SC and therefore the overall security 
of the SC itself. Therefore the development of security benchmarks 
has to address a number of key areas and focus on the security sub-
sets within these areas.  The following list is by no means definitive, 
but provides a starting point (Pye, 2003): 
 
§ Organisational security benchmarks 
§ Organisational security management policy  
§ Information security management  
§ Personnel security management  
§ Security incident reporting  
§ Infrastructure security benchmarks 
§ Physical security management  
§ Equipment security management  
§ General and media management  
§ Application security benchmarks 
§ Malicious software security management  
§ Electronic mail security management  
§ Encryption management. 
§ Network/system security benchmarks; 
§ Network/system communication control  
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§ System security management  
§ Network/system security management 
§ System use monitoring. 
§ User access management security benchmarks 
§ Password management  
§ Authentication management  
 
The authors suggest that regular proactive benchmarking of the 
security measures and policies will enable individual businesses 
within the electronic SC to review their current security status and 
continue to strengthen and improve security through the application 
of continuous improvement of the benchmark security goal. This will 
promote a strengthening ‘flow on’ effect that will not only promote 
greater trust and confidence between the business partners of the 
electronic SC, but will also strengthen the security across the whole 
electronic SC through the adoption of a common security level. The 
benefit of security benchmarking within the electronic SC may in 
fact have a more far reaching consequence, particularly when 
considering the potential ramifications of the electronic information 
infrastructure connecting together cooperating business entities. 
 
A Potential supply chain vulnerability exemplar 
To put electronic SC e -security benchmarking into context, consider 
the scenario of a large logistical SC that is responsible for delivering 
food products from agricultural production, through processing, 
manufacturing, transport and distribution, storage and finally to 
retail utilising an underlying electronic SC that connects together 
the cooperating business partners (Wells, 2004).  
 
The authors contend that if a common security benchmarking 
standard was not effectively implemented across the entire 
electronic SC by each individual SC partner then this exposes the 
security integrity of the entire SC to potentially damaging effects and 
consequences of threats or accidents. For instance, if one business 
entity of the electronic SC did not implement any security 
benchmarking in alignment with the security status of other 
cooperating SC entities then subsequently their particular security 
system would not have the same security status as the rest of the 
electronic SC. As a consequence of the openness between 
cooperating business IS’s within this SC then a computer virus 
could potentially spread via this single security weakness and 
proliferate into other information systems across the SC with 
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detrimental results upon the integrity and functionality of the rest of 
the electronic SC’s interconnected IS’s in a cascading manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The security of the electronic SC is only as strong as the weakest 
link and therefore it is incumbent upon the individual organisational 
partners to be proactive in continuously benchmarking and 
improving their security measures and policies in order to effectively 
protect or indeed pre-empt any likely damage resulting from possible 
threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on 
the functionality.  
 
It could also be postulated, within the scope of SCM, that all 
participating organisational nodes may have  to conform to agreed 
security benchmarks in order to be permitted to interact within a 
specific electronic SC and therefore smaller organisations would 
have to meet the security requirements imposed upon them by 
larger participating SC organisational nodes. 
 
E-security can no longer be regarded as ‘set and forget’ under this 
regime because the dynamically changing nature of the threat 
environment necessitates that security measures and policies need 
to be fluid in their practical application. Security benchmarking 
attempts to address this situation in a proactive ongoing or 
continuous improvement manner and provides guidance to 
participating partner organisations within the SC on how they can 
address security concerns within their individual nodes that would 
result in a stronger security presence across the entire electronic 
SC.  
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incorporate this electronic infrastructure technology into 
establishing electronic-based supply chains. With the improved 
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be taken into account for protecting the integrity of the electronic 
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these need to be consistent throughout the supply chain and 
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they meet adequate security standards.  
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Supply Chain (SC) proponents have initially invested significant time 
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shortening the product life-cycle within a SC. Through re-
engineering business processes and introducing information 
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right price. However, vulnerabilities to electronic SC security do 
exist at several overlapping levels including business-oriented, SC-
centric, technical, and traditional security (Pierce, et al, 2003) and 
the consequences of such exploited vulnerabilities could be 
potentially devastating to the business concerned or more 
importantly impart a cascading effect across the electronic SC 
involving other SC business partners. For example, the 
vulnerabilities could be exploited by indiscriminate internal or 
externally located hackers, a disgruntled employee, or may involve 
corporate espionage. Whatever the motivation, SC partners should 
address these vulnerabilities to minimise the security risks and 
suppress the potential opportunities for security breaches and 
thereby enhance the protection status of the electronic SC.  
 
One method of assessing an organisation's security presence within 
the electronic SC setting is through benchmarking the security 
measures and policies of the various business entities or nodes that 
make up the SC. According to Codling, (1996, p8) benchmarking is 
‘an ongoing process of measuring and improving products, services 
and practices against the best that can be identified worldwide’ and 
this principle can also be applied to the security implementations of 
businesses within the electronic SC.  
 
This systematic evaluation inherent in the benchmarking process 
has been previously adopted by traditional business as a practice for 
analysing and measuring competitive performance attributes, such 
as costs, strategies, and products within their respective business 
domain. Through the application of the benchmarking analysis 
process it is possible for businesses to compare themselves against 
their peers and determine their level of deviation from the ‘norm’, or 
recognise the significance of other established benchmarks 
pertaining to a given number of parameters (Codling, 1996). 
 
Thus it is proposed that the process of benchmarking analysis can 
also be applied to the electronic security (e-security) measures and 
policies of business entities within the SC. This paper outlines the 
nature of electronic SCs, identifies the inherent e-security 
vulnerabilities, the benchmarking concept of E-security within the 
SC and how e-security benchmarking can be used to analyse and 
address security concerns within the domain of the electronic SC. 
 
 
Supply Chain Security: 
The Need for Continuous Assessment 
6 
 
 
The Electronic Supply Chain 
The authors acknowledge that a major premise of SCM is the 
facilitation of bi-directional information flows across the SC and that 
the results of this are typically evidenced by reductions in non-value 
adding services, production costs, storage and transportation costs, 
errors, product lead time, product lifecycle and overall 
improvements in product quality, quality of information, quality of 
service, communication, and SC relationships. (Although some 
researchers suggest the reverse is a more accurate account of SC 
relationships, viz. Stein et al, 2003; Stockdale and Standing, 2003), 
these sentiments are generally accepted by academics and 
practitioners alike. 
 
The diffusion of communication technology and the proliferation and 
of the electronic communication medium on the back of the 
Internet, now underpins efforts to efficiently streamline the SC and 
hasten operational processes. Hence, the electronic supply chain 
consists of a number of cooperating business entities whose IS’s are 
interconnected via the electronic public infrastructure of the 
Internet, which supports the exchange of information between SC 
partners and serves as the medium for delivering digital services, 
conducting financial transactions and information exchange or 
information sharing.  
 
Therefore the Internet is providing SC entities with many 
opportunities to collaborate with business partners using innovative 
e-commerce solutions. SC and business-to-business (B2B) uses of 
the Internet have come in the form of auction websites – both buyer-
side and seller-side, e-procurement systems (e.g. 
http://www.alibaba.com), virtual private networks (VPN), Internet-
based electronic data interchange (EDI), and consortium trading 
exchanges (CTE) such as the global network exchange 
(http://www.gnx.com) (Turban et al, 2002). 
 
The innovative application of existing public infrastructure and 
technology have provided SC partners with unprecedented 
improvements in business operations.  Also the ease with which SC 
partners can integrate their networks and coordinate their efforts, 
has had a major impact on SCM as managers become increasingly 
reliant upon the Internet for connectivity (Warren & Hutchinson, 
2000). However, with this freedom of connectivity to the Internet 
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comes the insecurity and openness of the infrastructure itself that 
can be exploited and expose businesses and subsequent electronic 
SC’s to insidious vulnerabilities when utilising the Internet.  
 
Electronic Supply chain vulnerabilities 
As SC technologies have continued to develop in complexity, so too 
have the risks that are posed to the businesses that employ them 
(Vasiu, et al, 2002). While the Internet has provided unparalleled 
business prospects, the unwary can succumb to a plethora of 
routinely discovered vulnerability exploits in Internet-enabled 
software. Smith, Yurcik, and Doss (2002) intimate some of main 
risks that businesses are exposed to when doing business on the 
Internet: 
§ Current software engineering techniques do not produce 
systems that are immune to attack; 
§ Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their 
systems against attack; 
§ Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends; 
§ Little evidence to suggest improved security since 
organisations are continually playing ‘catch-up’ with routinely 
discovered vulnerabilities; 
§ Current security tools only address piecemeal technical 
aspects of security whereas information security is a holistic 
issue; and, 
§ System administration is difficult to manage due to 
continuous system patching (Smith et al., 2002). 
The attraction of utilising the convenience of the Internet for 
communication interconnectivity between SC partners can expose 
these businesses to security risks and vulnerabilities that if 
breached, will compromise the security of the entire SC, thus 
placing other businesses making up the SC, at risk. Research 
undertaken by Warren and Hutchinson (2000) identified some of the 
more common information security risks and vulnerabilities SC 
practitioners should be aware of when utilising the Internet as part 
to f the SC communication infrastructure. For example, one of the 
most common forms of attack is password cracking where software 
is programmed to guess and apply common types of passwords, 
such as first names, or it can sequentially test each ASCII 
combination until a match is found. When passwords have been 
cracked the attacker(s) can then log on to a system and, posing as a 
legitimate user, can proceed to steal, modify or erase information.  
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Spoofing attacks occur when the ‘from’ Internet Protocol (IP) address 
is forged to enable a deceptive message to appear as though it 
originated from a trusted source, such as a business partner within 
the SC. Another form of spoofing, known as web spoofing, occurs 
when an assailant sets up a website that looks remarkably similar 
to a trusted website. An example could be WWW.C0LES.COM (spelt 
‘C-zero-L-E-S’), where an attacker may attempt to replicate the 
Cole’s website and collect financial information and passwords from 
business partners that mistakenly visit the website. This bears a 
similar resemblance to recent banking scams that dupe the 
unsuspecting into revealing sensitive information that, like 
password cracking and spoofing attacks, results in the attacker 
collecting legitimate financial and password information that can 
later be used to masquerade as a legitimate user in subsequent 
attacks (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000). 
 
A denial of service (DoS) attack occurs when an attacker floods the 
target host with such an overwhelming number of messages that it 
physically cannot cope with the load and shuts down and thus 
denies legitimate users access to the system. While most DoS 
attacks are regarded as nuisance attacks they nonetheless can still 
inflict considerable financial loss on the target system due to the 
loss of connectivity for prolonged periods (Warren and Hutchinson, 
2000). 
 
Perhaps the worst threat is a direct attack on a target system. In 
this situation the attacker works methodically to expose and exploit 
known and unknown vulnerabilities on the target system. Once the 
attacker gains access to the system, they generally attempt to gain 
Administrator privileges to the system so they can set themselves up 
as a legitimate user to steal, modify or delete information or even 
undertake ongoing corporate sabotage.  
 
Whatever the security situation, SC practitioners can address 
potential electronic security vulnerabilities by undertaking a 
thorough risk analysis of the environment and by incorporating 
adherence to internationally recognised standards in information 
security. Initially however, SC practitioners can improve their 
security systems and practices quickly by applying benchmarking 
techniques that can standardise their approach and ensure best 
practice is adopted. The following section elaborates further on how 
benchmarking can be applied to SCs and therefore facilitate in 
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potentially minimising the risks that vulnerabilities pose to their 
systems.  
 
E-security Benchmarking 
Kolokotronis et al, (2002) noted that all too often e-security was 
regarded as a technological issue that was addressed as an 
afterthought to the implementation process and therefore treated as 
a ‘bolt on’ element that remained unchanged until a security 
incident occurred that breached the current security measures and 
policies in place. In contrast to this perception, Kolokotronis et al 
(2002) proposed that E-security should be regarded as a major 
consideration of the system development plan, which should be 
reviewed against established security benchmarks. This would 
maintain quality and deliver optimal security performance via a 
cyclic revisional system that would ensure the security system 
continued to perform and meet business requirements. 
 
The research of McGaughey (2002) into the benefits of 
benchmarking in an e -business environment establishes a number 
of key points that illustrate the generic benefits that can be gained 
from applying the benchmarking process: 
 
§ The benchmarking process is ongoing, as current business 
practices and performance dynamically change and require 
constant revision to reflect internal and external influences of 
the business environment 
 
§ Quantitative  benchmarks that measure performance are 
preferred; however qualitative measures must also be applied 
to information that cannot be quantitatively measured 
 
§ Benchmarking should be applied across the spectrum of 
business processes, products and activities because they all 
contribute to the success or failure of the business 
 
§ Comparative benchmarking against other business 
competitors is essential in order to identify and adopt best 
practices that are beneficial to improving business outcomes 
 
§ While the goal of benchmarking is to essentially improve 
business performance from a competitive viewpoint, it can 
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also be tailored to specific business areas identified for 
improvement 
 
§ In essence, benchmarking is about identifying, improving and 
learning how to do better the targeted business processes and 
also protect the business against potential threats 
 
In principle, the benchmarking benefits that McGaughey (2002) 
alludes to can also be specifically applied to the e -business security 
measures and policies that are utilised to protect an e -business from 
threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, security benchmarking 
can also be taken another step further and applied to benchmarking 
the security features within an electronic SC. 
 
The ready availability and utilisation of new communication 
technologies by business organisations in the pursuit of greater 
efficiencies in SCM can speed up the exchange of information, 
within the environment of B2B e-commerce over the insecure 
infrastructure of the Internet. However, the individual businesses 
that make up the electronic SC have to seriously analyse and 
implement their own security requirements in order to protect, not 
only their own security interests, but also that of their SC 
counterparts (Al-Mashari, 2002).  
 
The responsibility of implementing appropriate security measures 
and policies to protect the information within an electronic SC 
business for information exchange between SC partners falls to the 
individual SC businesses that make up the electronic SC. Effective 
security measures and policies need to be implemented and 
continuously assessed in order to meet the changing security 
requirements of the individual business organisations and the 
environment of the SC itself. In order to initially deliver and 
establish effective security benchmarks in an Australian context for 
example, the Australian and New Zealand Standard part one 
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 (Standards Australia, 2001) and part 
two AS/NZS 7799.2: 2003 (Standards Australia, 2003) for 
information security management would be the logical starting point 
for the development of such security benchmark development. 
 
Sole reliance on just meeting any internationally recognised 
standard for information security management by SC practitioners 
and SC partners will not guarantee that the security benchmarks 
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developed for assessing security measures and policies 
implemented, will continue to be secure (Standards Australia, 2001). 
Threats and vulnerabilities do not remain static and are constantly 
changing and therefore the security measures and policies in place 
need to be regularly assessed in order to continually improve, 
update or adapt to the dynamically changing nature of threats and 
vulnerabilities to the electronic SC, also alluded to by Smith et al 
(2002). Therefore through the application of regular benchmarking 
of current security measures and policies, steps can be taken to 
review and upgrade the security measures and policies of SC 
partners and therefore strengthen the effectiveness of the 
benchmarked security measures and policies (McGaughey, 2002).  
 
The premise of security benchmarking requires that the security 
benchmarks themselves have to establish a minimum security 
requirement in conjunction with a higher security goal that exceeds 
the current security criterion benchmarked. Following each 
particular benchmarking assessment of a security measure or policy 
the particular benchmark’s security goal is reassessed and updated.  
This is undertaken as a process of continuous improvement to 
promote continued strengthening of the security status of the 
business within the electronic SC and therefore the overall security 
of the SC itself. Therefore the development of security benchmarks 
has to address a number of key areas and focus on the security sub-
sets within these areas.  The following list is by no means definitive, 
but provides a starting point (Pye, 2003): 
 
§ Organisational security benchmarks 
§ Organisational security management policy  
§ Information security management  
§ Personnel security management  
§ Security incident reporting  
§ Infrastructure security benchmarks 
§ Physical security management  
§ Equipment security management  
§ General and media management  
§ Application security benchmarks 
§ Malicious software security management  
§ Electronic mail security management  
§ Encryption management. 
§ Network/system security benchmarks; 
§ Network/system communication control  
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§ System security management  
§ Network/system security management 
§ System use monitoring. 
§ User access management security benchmarks 
§ Password management  
§ Authentication management  
 
The authors suggest that regular proactive benchmarking of the 
security measures and policies will enable individual businesses 
within the electronic SC to review their current security status and 
continue to strengthen and improve security through the application 
of continuous improvement of the benchmark security goal. This will 
promote a strengthening ‘flow on’ effect that will not only promote 
greater trust and confidence between the business partners of the 
electronic SC, but will also strengthen the security across the whole 
electronic SC through the adoption of a common security level. The 
benefit of security benchmarking within the electronic SC may in 
fact have a more far reaching consequence, particularly when 
considering the potential ramifications of the electronic information 
infrastructure connecting together cooperating business entities. 
 
A Potential supply chain vulnerability exemplar 
To put electronic SC e -security benchmarking into context, consider 
the scenario of a large logistical SC that is responsible for delivering 
food products from agricultural production, through processing, 
manufacturing, transport and distribution, storage and finally to 
retail utilising an underlying electronic SC that connects together 
the cooperating business partners (Wells, 2004).  
 
The authors contend that if a common security benchmarking 
standard was not effectively implemented across the entire 
electronic SC by each individual SC partner then this exposes the 
security integrity of the entire SC to potentially damaging effects and 
consequences of threats or accidents. For instance, if one business 
entity of the electronic SC did not implement any security 
benchmarking in alignment with the security status of other 
cooperating SC entities then subsequently their particular security 
system would not have the same security status as the rest of the 
electronic SC. As a consequence of the openness between 
cooperating business IS’s within this SC then a computer virus 
could potentially spread via this single security weakness and 
proliferate into other information systems across the SC with 
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detrimental results upon the integrity and functionality of the rest of 
the electronic SC’s interconnected IS’s in a cascading manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The security of the electronic SC is only as strong as the weakest 
link and therefore it is incumbent upon the individual organisational 
partners to be proactive in continuously benchmarking and 
improving their security measures and policies in order to effectively 
protect or indeed pre-empt any likely damage resulting from possible 
threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on 
the functionality.  
 
It could also be postulated, within the scope of SCM, that all 
participating organisational nodes may have  to conform to agreed 
security benchmarks in order to be permitted to interact within a 
specific electronic SC and therefore smaller organisations would 
have to meet the security requirements imposed upon them by 
larger participating SC organisational nodes. 
 
E-security can no longer be regarded as ‘set and forget’ under this 
regime because the dynamically changing nature of the threat 
environment necessitates that security measures and policies need 
to be fluid in their practical application. Security benchmarking 
attempts to address this situation in a proactive ongoing or 
continuous improvement manner and provides guidance to 
participating partner organisations within the SC on how they can 
address security concerns within their individual nodes that would 
result in a stronger security presence across the entire electronic 
SC.  
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Abstract 
Ease of Internet accessibility has offered business the opportunity to 
incorporate this electronic infrastructure technology into 
establishing electronic-based supply chains. With the improved 
efficiency that this brings to the management and functionality of 
the supply chain, there are also security considerations that should 
be taken into account for protecting the integrity of the electronic 
supply chain, not only within each business node, but also across 
the entire supply chain. Such security vulnerabilities can be negated 
with the implementation of security measures and policies, however 
these need to be consistent throughout the supply chain and 
regularly assessed against security benchmarks in order to ensure 
they meet adequate security standards.  
 
Introduction  
Supply Chain (SC) proponents have initially invested significant time 
and effort in gaining efficiencies through reducing lead time and 
shortening the product life-cycle within a SC. Through re-
engineering business processes and introducing information 
systems (IS) designed to integrate within the business entity and 
externally with the IS systems of other SC business partners. In 
short, this supply chain management (SCM) practice requires that 
the integrated IS’s within an electronic SC, by functional necessity, 
must exhibit characteristics of openness. 
 
Until now the security implications of the inherent openness of these 
IS’s within the SC has not been a high priority concern to SCM 
practitioners, due to the primary focus of getting the right product, 
to the right place, at the right time, in the right quantity, for the 
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right price. However, vulnerabilities to electronic SC security do 
exist at several overlapping levels including business-oriented, SC-
centric, technical, and traditional security (Pierce, et al, 2003) and 
the consequences of such exploited vulnerabilities could be 
potentially devastating to the business concerned or more 
importantly impart a cascading effect across the electronic SC 
involving other SC business partners. For example, the 
vulnerabilities could be exploited by indiscriminate internal or 
externally located hackers, a disgruntled employee, or may involve 
corporate espionage. Whatever the motivation, SC partners should 
address these vulnerabilities to minimise the security risks and 
suppress the potential opportunities for security breaches and 
thereby enhance the protection status of the electronic SC.  
 
One method of assessing an organisation's security presence within 
the electronic SC setting is through benchmarking the security 
measures and policies of the various business entities or nodes that 
make up the SC. According to Codling, (1996, p8) benchmarking is 
‘an ongoing process of measuring and improving products, services 
and practices against the best that can be identified worldwide’ and 
this principle can also be applied to the security implementations of 
businesses within the electronic SC.  
 
This systematic evaluation inherent in the benchmarking process 
has been previously adopted by traditional business as a practice for 
analysing and measuring competitive performance attributes, such 
as costs, strategies, and products within their respective business 
domain. Through the application of the benchmarking analysis 
process it is possible for businesses to compare themselves against 
their peers and determine their level of deviation from the ‘norm’, or 
recognise the significance of other established benchmarks 
pertaining to a given number of parameters (Codling, 1996). 
 
Thus it is proposed that the process of benchmarking analysis can 
also be applied to the electronic security (e-security) measures and 
policies of business entities within the SC. This paper outlines the 
nature of electronic SCs, identifies the inherent e-security 
vulnerabilities, the benchmarking concept of E-security within the 
SC and how e-security benchmarking can be used to analyse and 
address security concerns within the domain of the electronic SC. 
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The Electronic Supply Chain 
The authors acknowledge that a major premise of SCM is the 
facilitation of bi-directional information flows across the SC and that 
the results of this are typically evidenced by reductions in non-value 
adding services, production costs, storage and transportation costs, 
errors, product lead time, product lifecycle and overall 
improvements in product quality, quality of information, quality of 
service, communication, and SC relationships. (Although some 
researchers suggest the reverse is a more accurate account of SC 
relationships, viz. Stein et al, 2003; Stockdale and Standing, 2003), 
these sentiments are generally accepted by academics and 
practitioners alike. 
 
The diffusion of communication technology and the proliferation and 
of the electronic communication medium on the back of the 
Internet, now underpins efforts to efficiently streamline the SC and 
hasten operational processes. Hence, the electronic supply chain 
consists of a number of cooperating business entities whose IS’s are 
interconnected via the electronic public infrastructure of the 
Internet, which supports the exchange of information between SC 
partners and serves as the medium for delivering digital services, 
conducting financial transactions and information exchange or 
information sharing.  
 
Therefore the Internet is providing SC entities with many 
opportunities to collaborate with business partners using innovative 
e-commerce solutions. SC and business-to-business (B2B) uses of 
the Internet have come in the form of auction websites – both buyer-
side and seller-side, e-procurement systems (e.g. 
http://www.alibaba.com), virtual private networks (VPN), Internet-
based electronic data interchange (EDI), and consortium trading 
exchanges (CTE) such as the global network exchange 
(http://www.gnx.com) (Turban et al, 2002). 
 
The innovative application of existing public infrastructure and 
technology have provided SC partners with unprecedented 
improvements in business operations.  Also the ease with which SC 
partners can integrate their networks and coordinate their efforts, 
has had a major impact on SCM as managers become increasingly 
reliant upon the Internet for connectivity (Warren & Hutchinson, 
2000). However, with this freedom of connectivity to the Internet 
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comes the insecurity and openness of the infrastructure itself that 
can be exploited and expose businesses and subsequent electronic 
SC’s to insidious vulnerabilities when utilising the Internet.  
 
Electronic Supply chain vulnerabilities 
As SC technologies have continued to develop in complexity, so too 
have the risks that are posed to the businesses that employ them 
(Vasiu, et al, 2002). While the Internet has provided unparalleled 
business prospects, the unwary can succumb to a plethora of 
routinely discovered vulnerability exploits in Internet-enabled 
software. Smith, Yurcik, and Doss (2002) intimate some of main 
risks that businesses are exposed to when doing business on the 
Internet: 
§ Current software engineering techniques do not produce 
systems that are immune to attack; 
§ Organisations do not have the expertise to defend their 
systems against attack; 
§ Cyberspace legislation lags behind current attack trends; 
§ Little evidence to suggest improved security since 
organisations are continually playing ‘catch-up’ with routinely 
discovered vulnerabilities; 
§ Current security tools only address piecemeal technical 
aspects of security whereas information security is a holistic 
issue; and, 
§ System administration is difficult to manage due to 
continuous system patching (Smith et al., 2002). 
The attraction of utilising the convenience of the Internet for 
communication interconnectivity between SC partners can expose 
these businesses to security risks and vulnerabilities that if 
breached, will compromise the security of the entire SC, thus 
placing other businesses making up the SC, at risk. Research 
undertaken by Warren and Hutchinson (2000) identified some of the 
more common information security risks and vulnerabilities SC 
practitioners should be aware of when utilising the Internet as part 
to f the SC communication infrastructure. For example, one of the 
most common forms of attack is password cracking where software 
is programmed to guess and apply common types of passwords, 
such as first names, or it can sequentially test each ASCII 
combination until a match is found. When passwords have been 
cracked the attacker(s) can then log on to a system and, posing as a 
legitimate user, can proceed to steal, modify or erase information.  
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Spoofing attacks occur when the ‘from’ Internet Protocol (IP) address 
is forged to enable a deceptive message to appear as though it 
originated from a trusted source, such as a business partner within 
the SC. Another form of spoofing, known as web spoofing, occurs 
when an assailant sets up a website that looks remarkably similar 
to a trusted website. An example could be WWW.C0LES.COM (spelt 
‘C-zero-L-E-S’), where an attacker may attempt to replicate the 
Cole’s website and collect financial information and passwords from 
business partners that mistakenly visit the website. This bears a 
similar resemblance to recent banking scams that dupe the 
unsuspecting into revealing sensitive information that, like 
password cracking and spoofing attacks, results in the attacker 
collecting legitimate financial and password information that can 
later be used to masquerade as a legitimate user in subsequent 
attacks (Warren and Hutchinson, 2000). 
 
A denial of service (DoS) attack occurs when an attacker floods the 
target host with such an overwhelming number of messages that it 
physically cannot cope with the load and shuts down and thus 
denies legitimate users access to the system. While most DoS 
attacks are regarded as nuisance attacks they nonetheless can still 
inflict considerable financial loss on the target system due to the 
loss of connectivity for prolonged periods (Warren and Hutchinson, 
2000). 
 
Perhaps the worst threat is a direct attack on a target system. In 
this situation the attacker works methodically to expose and exploit 
known and unknown vulnerabilities on the target system. Once the 
attacker gains access to the system, they generally attempt to gain 
Administrator privileges to the system so they can set themselves up 
as a legitimate user to steal, modify or delete information or even 
undertake ongoing corporate sabotage.  
 
Whatever the security situation, SC practitioners can address 
potential electronic security vulnerabilities by undertaking a 
thorough risk analysis of the environment and by incorporating 
adherence to internationally recognised standards in information 
security. Initially however, SC practitioners can improve their 
security systems and practices quickly by applying benchmarking 
techniques that can standardise their approach and ensure best 
practice is adopted. The following section elaborates further on how 
benchmarking can be applied to SCs and therefore facilitate in 
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potentially minimising the risks that vulnerabilities pose to their 
systems.  
 
E-security Benchmarking 
Kolokotronis et al, (2002) noted that all too often e-security was 
regarded as a technological issue that was addressed as an 
afterthought to the implementation process and therefore treated as 
a ‘bolt on’ element that remained unchanged until a security 
incident occurred that breached the current security measures and 
policies in place. In contrast to this perception, Kolokotronis et al 
(2002) proposed that E-security should be regarded as a major 
consideration of the system development plan, which should be 
reviewed against established security benchmarks. This would 
maintain quality and deliver optimal security performance via a 
cyclic revisional system that would ensure the security system 
continued to perform and meet business requirements. 
 
The research of McGaughey (2002) into the benefits of 
benchmarking in an e -business environment establishes a number 
of key points that illustrate the generic benefits that can be gained 
from applying the benchmarking process: 
 
§ The benchmarking process is ongoing, as current business 
practices and performance dynamically change and require 
constant revision to reflect internal and external influences of 
the business environment 
 
§ Quantitative  benchmarks that measure performance are 
preferred; however qualitative measures must also be applied 
to information that cannot be quantitatively measured 
 
§ Benchmarking should be applied across the spectrum of 
business processes, products and activities because they all 
contribute to the success or failure of the business 
 
§ Comparative benchmarking against other business 
competitors is essential in order to identify and adopt best 
practices that are beneficial to improving business outcomes 
 
§ While the goal of benchmarking is to essentially improve 
business performance from a competitive viewpoint, it can 
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also be tailored to specific business areas identified for 
improvement 
 
§ In essence, benchmarking is about identifying, improving and 
learning how to do better the targeted business processes and 
also protect the business against potential threats 
 
In principle, the benchmarking benefits that McGaughey (2002) 
alludes to can also be specifically applied to the e -business security 
measures and policies that are utilised to protect an e -business from 
threats and vulnerabilities. Furthermore, security benchmarking 
can also be taken another step further and applied to benchmarking 
the security features within an electronic SC. 
 
The ready availability and utilisation of new communication 
technologies by business organisations in the pursuit of greater 
efficiencies in SCM can speed up the exchange of information, 
within the environment of B2B e-commerce over the insecure 
infrastructure of the Internet. However, the individual businesses 
that make up the electronic SC have to seriously analyse and 
implement their own security requirements in order to protect, not 
only their own security interests, but also that of their SC 
counterparts (Al-Mashari, 2002).  
 
The responsibility of implementing appropriate security measures 
and policies to protect the information within an electronic SC 
business for information exchange between SC partners falls to the 
individual SC businesses that make up the electronic SC. Effective 
security measures and policies need to be implemented and 
continuously assessed in order to meet the changing security 
requirements of the individual business organisations and the 
environment of the SC itself. In order to initially deliver and 
establish effective security benchmarks in an Australian context for 
example, the Australian and New Zealand Standard part one 
AS/NZS ISO/IEC 17799:2001 (Standards Australia, 2001) and part 
two AS/NZS 7799.2: 2003 (Standards Australia, 2003) for 
information security management would be the logical starting point 
for the development of such security benchmark development. 
 
Sole reliance on just meeting any internationally recognised 
standard for information security management by SC practitioners 
and SC partners will not guarantee that the security benchmarks 
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developed for assessing security measures and policies 
implemented, will continue to be secure (Standards Australia, 2001). 
Threats and vulnerabilities do not remain static and are constantly 
changing and therefore the security measures and policies in place 
need to be regularly assessed in order to continually improve, 
update or adapt to the dynamically changing nature of threats and 
vulnerabilities to the electronic SC, also alluded to by Smith et al 
(2002). Therefore through the application of regular benchmarking 
of current security measures and policies, steps can be taken to 
review and upgrade the security measures and policies of SC 
partners and therefore strengthen the effectiveness of the 
benchmarked security measures and policies (McGaughey, 2002).  
 
The premise of security benchmarking requires that the security 
benchmarks themselves have to establish a minimum security 
requirement in conjunction with a higher security goal that exceeds 
the current security criterion benchmarked. Following each 
particular benchmarking assessment of a security measure or policy 
the particular benchmark’s security goal is reassessed and updated.  
This is undertaken as a process of continuous improvement to 
promote continued strengthening of the security status of the 
business within the electronic SC and therefore the overall security 
of the SC itself. Therefore the development of security benchmarks 
has to address a number of key areas and focus on the security sub-
sets within these areas.  The following list is by no means definitive, 
but provides a starting point (Pye, 2003): 
 
§ Organisational security benchmarks 
§ Organisational security management policy  
§ Information security management  
§ Personnel security management  
§ Security incident reporting  
§ Infrastructure security benchmarks 
§ Physical security management  
§ Equipment security management  
§ General and media management  
§ Application security benchmarks 
§ Malicious software security management  
§ Electronic mail security management  
§ Encryption management. 
§ Network/system security benchmarks; 
§ Network/system communication control  
Supply Chain Security: 
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§ System security management  
§ Network/system security management 
§ System use monitoring. 
§ User access management security benchmarks 
§ Password management  
§ Authentication management  
 
The authors suggest that regular proactive benchmarking of the 
security measures and policies will enable individual businesses 
within the electronic SC to review their current security status and 
continue to strengthen and improve security through the application 
of continuous improvement of the benchmark security goal. This will 
promote a strengthening ‘flow on’ effect that will not only promote 
greater trust and confidence between the business partners of the 
electronic SC, but will also strengthen the security across the whole 
electronic SC through the adoption of a common security level. The 
benefit of security benchmarking within the electronic SC may in 
fact have a more far reaching consequence, particularly when 
considering the potential ramifications of the electronic information 
infrastructure connecting together cooperating business entities. 
 
A Potential supply chain vulnerability exemplar 
To put electronic SC e -security benchmarking into context, consider 
the scenario of a large logistical SC that is responsible for delivering 
food products from agricultural production, through processing, 
manufacturing, transport and distribution, storage and finally to 
retail utilising an underlying electronic SC that connects together 
the cooperating business partners (Wells, 2004).  
 
The authors contend that if a common security benchmarking 
standard was not effectively implemented across the entire 
electronic SC by each individual SC partner then this exposes the 
security integrity of the entire SC to potentially damaging effects and 
consequences of threats or accidents. For instance, if one business 
entity of the electronic SC did not implement any security 
benchmarking in alignment with the security status of other 
cooperating SC entities then subsequently their particular security 
system would not have the same security status as the rest of the 
electronic SC. As a consequence of the openness between 
cooperating business IS’s within this SC then a computer virus 
could potentially spread via this single security weakness and 
proliferate into other information systems across the SC with 
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detrimental results upon the integrity and functionality of the rest of 
the electronic SC’s interconnected IS’s in a cascading manner.  
 
Conclusion 
The security of the electronic SC is only as strong as the weakest 
link and therefore it is incumbent upon the individual organisational 
partners to be proactive in continuously benchmarking and 
improving their security measures and policies in order to effectively 
protect or indeed pre-empt any likely damage resulting from possible 
threats and vulnerabilities and their subsequent adverse effects on 
the functionality.  
 
It could also be postulated, within the scope of SCM, that all 
participating organisational nodes may have  to conform to agreed 
security benchmarks in order to be permitted to interact within a 
specific electronic SC and therefore smaller organisations would 
have to meet the security requirements imposed upon them by 
larger participating SC organisational nodes. 
 
E-security can no longer be regarded as ‘set and forget’ under this 
regime because the dynamically changing nature of the threat 
environment necessitates that security measures and policies need 
to be fluid in their practical application. Security benchmarking 
attempts to address this situation in a proactive ongoing or 
continuous improvement manner and provides guidance to 
participating partner organisations within the SC on how they can 
address security concerns within their individual nodes that would 
result in a stronger security presence across the entire electronic 
SC.  
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